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.  Background: Intercorporate Relationships as Social Relations
　　Corporate scandal occur frequently and are a global problem. In order to tackle this 
one particular problem to be solved is how to check and monitor corporate behavior and 
corporate power structure. In order to comprehend an enterprise and society, in this 
paper, I will  focus on the power balance between the corporate power and the stakeholder, 
paying particular attention to inter-corporate relations as one of the social relations among 
enterprises. An interlock is created when two companies share the same director ; such 
a  director,  sits on two or more boards, is termed as a multiple director. The typology of 
interlocks is based on the intensity of an interlock between any two companies.
　　I consider that inter-corporate relations influence directors’ activities, particulary 
corporate power and the top-management function of individual companies, by means 
of constraint conditions. Zeitlin indicates that research must focus at the outset on 
the complex relationships in which a single corporation is itself involved, namely, the 
relationships between it and other corporations; the forms of personal union or interlocking 
between corporate directorate (Zeitlin, [94] pp.0-02.). In order to elucidate the 
structure of intercorporate relations, which applies the graph theory of mathematics to 
social structure analysis and this employd to measure intercoporate pesonal relations. 
Accordingly, in this paper, I will focus on the structure of intercorporate personal relations 
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among enterprises within the networks of US and  Japan.  Further, I will attempt to 
clarify the structure of interlocking directorate networks, because they depend on the 
system of intercorporate relationships in which the individual corporations are implicated. 
　　Intercorporate relations comprise a variety of capital, commercial, and personal 
connections among individual corporations. Since intercorporate personal relations act at 
the board level, or the top management level where strategic decisions are made, in this 
paper.  I will focus on intercorporate personal relations
)
.
Figure1  Perspective of Intercorporate Network
　　　　　Source: Stockman, Ziegler and Scott (eds.) [9] Networks of Corporate Power, Polity Press, p. .
　　The analysis of intercorporate personal relations can be classified into organizational, 
social background, interorganizational, and class-hegemony perspectives (Figuere). On 
the interorganizational perspective, intercorporate relations are regarded as a factor of 
the environment around individual companies and as a factor to make decision regarding 
the operation. In this paper, I will attempt to analyze of intercorporate personal networks 
based on the interorganizational parspective.
　　Multiple directors that form an interlocking network possess an opportunity to 
obtain inside information about individual companies, and they perform the function of 
communicating the relevant information about one company to the other company. In 
contrast, outside, independent, or non-executive directors obtain information and opinions 
from outside the company and function as the advisers on ideas evolved within the 
executive. Therefore, multiple directors function as the representatives of the systems of 
finance capital as a whole.
　　Consequently, intercorporate personal relations at a top-management level, are 
regarded as an information channel that influences corporate power, particulary the 
strategic decision making of the top-management
2)
. I consider that observing the structure 
 ) With regard to reseach on the ownership and control of large enterprise groups in the 990s, see 
Nakata [99].
 2) For the significance of the research on business administration on interlocking directorates, see 
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of interlocking directorate is informative, since it exists relatively independent of 
intercorporate shareholding
2.  The Theoretical Model of Intercorporate Personal Relations and Corporate Power
　　In this paper, I investigate intercorporate personal relations as one aspect of social 
relations among large corporations. In order to achieve this, firstly, I introduce classical 
studies on interlocking directorates. Previous research on interlocking directorates 
between banks and non-financial enterprises was conducted by Jeidels O.[90], Hilferding 
R.[90], and Lenin V. I.[96] as the basis for their analyses of economic power. 
　　Jeidels, on the whole, claimed the following concerning the relations between banks 
and industries, based on the development of banking in Germany.  Intercorporate personal 
relations between banks and industries existed between many companies, where banks 
were allowed to intervene in the management of the companies as being members of the 
supervisory board. Therefore, with regard to the relations between banks and industries, 
Jeidels’ assertion comprehended and applied the original model of bank control, which 
states that banks have control over industrial companies.
　　Hilferding emphasized that the auditors were dispatched from the banks as a member 
of the supervisory board of industrial companies, focusing on the capital flow on banks. 
Intercorporate personal relations between banks and industries were understood as a 
means for banks to monitor these companies that they were related to and which served 
their interest. Therefore, command of power centered on the auditors who dispatched from 
banks.
　　Jeidels and Hilferding argued the superiority of banks in the intercorporate personal 
relations between banks and industries.  They insisted that in the then German banking 
system, the banks could control the industries on the ground of this superiority. In 
contrast, Lenin insisted “A personal union, so to speak, is established between the banks 
and the biggest industrial and commercial enterprises, the merging of one with another 
through the acquisition of shares, through the appointment of bank directors to the 
Supervisory Board (or Boards of Directors) of industrial and commercial enterprises, and 
vice versa” (Lenin, [96] Chapter 2). Moreover, he claimed that “the concentration of 
production; the monopolies arising therefrom; the merging or coalescence of the banks with 
Nakata, Hosoi, and Iwanami [99] pp.0-2.
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industry – such is the history of the rise of finance capital and such is the content of this 
term”(ibid., pp.-4.). In other words, intercorporate personal relations are considered to 
be a fusion and coalescence between mega banks and the largest industries, and not those 
of control and subordination.
　　Secondly, I prvide an outline of contemporary study on interlocking directorates, 
useing a classified model of corporate power in intercorporate relations designed by Scott 
J. (Stokman, Ziegler, and Scott [9]). In this paper, I consider the model of management 
control/resource dependence, bank control, and finance capital.
　　In the model of management control and resource dependence on interlocking 
directorate, Berle A. and Means G. C. [92] have proposed management control,  pointing 
out the existence of a high level of share dispersal in large corporations. Following this, 
numerous managerialists based and developed their arguments on this claim.  Currently, 
managerialists are in dispute over the ultimate consequences of this type of inside 
control. Enterprises in which there is a high level of share dispersal continuously scan 
their environment through interlocks. Internal or executive directors of enterprises have 
enhanced opportunities for action. In this model, interlocking directorates are understood 
from the point of view that interlocks accelerate cooperative behavior, maintaining 
autonomy and utilizing reciprocal resources such as capital, technology, information, and 
so on. On the other hand, in the model of constrained managerial control, Herman, E. S. 
[9] argues that outside or non-executive directors who are on the boards may be able to 
limit managerial options.
　　In the model of bank control, interlocks are created for the purpose of control. 
Representative scholars insisting on this model are Fitch R. and Oppenheimer M. [90a, 
b, and c] and Kotz D. M.[9]. According to this model, based on capital and commercial 
relations, a bank may attempt to exercise control over another in order to maximize its 
own advantage. The model of bank control has broadly stressed this type of interlock. 
However, bank interlocks do not result from attempts at control. Non-financial companies 
seek a vertical interlock with banks and other financial institutions in oder to ensure 
easier access to capital. Since those companies are well placed in comparison with banks, 
they tend to find themselves in a better position to obtain capital. 
　　The concept of hegemonic domination can be used, albeit not the bank control model 
proposed by Mintz B. and Schwartz M. [9].  Owing to the position of banks in the 
flow of capital in the intercorporate networks, banks evolved into hegemonic enterprises. 
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Consequently, interlock networks create a pattern of financial hegemony.
　　The model of finance capital indentifies the specific role of banks and other financial 
institutions. Finance capital represents the fusion of banking and industrial monopoly 
capital. In order words, banking and non-financial capital fuse to form finance capital.  In 
such a model banks and financial institutions occupy central positions in the network. 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand finance capital as involving distinct forms of inter-
corporate relation.
　　Therefore, in this paper, when I consider interlocking directorates within large 
corporations as the channels of institutional information in an intercorporate network, I 
adopt the finance capital model that appears to be useful in understanding the structure of 
the network in consideration.
.  Social Network Analysis in Intercorporate Relationships
　　Social network analysis focuses on the patterns of the relationships between actors 
(individuals, groups, organizations, or other formations) and not on the individual 
characteristics of these actors.  In this paper, I will specify the structure of interlocking 
directorates through the methods of social network analysis
)
 . 
　　First, I will measure the centrality score of individual corporations, constituting  the 
network. Local centrality (henceforth, centrality) refers to the immediate connections of 
the companies and is typically measured by its adjacency.  Therefore, a central company, 
has a large number of degree between its neighbors. By measuring the centrality 
nidividual corporations, it is possible to identify those companies that hold relatively 
individual central positions (Scott, [2000] pp.2-4.).
　　Second, I will examine the cohesion of a network. The cohesiveness of a network is 
represented by the features of the network as a whole. Here, the single most frequently 
used measure of cohesiveness is density.  Density is the ratio of the actual number of 
lines in the network to the number of lines that would be present if all the points were 
connected to all others.  It is caluculated useing the formula taken from Scott (see Scott 
[2000] p..). Further, I proposed that density is useful in longitudinal comparisons of the 
same partial network over time. 
 ) For detailed explanation on social network analysis, see Freeman, L.C., White, D.R., and Romney, A. K. 
[99]. Further, for a detailed explanation on the methods of analysis in this paper, see Scott [2000].
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  　　　N (N － ) / 2
  L :  the number of lines
  N :  the number of points
　　Third, I will identify the internal structure of a network by nesting the components. 
The basic image in a nested analysis is that of a contour map, wherein each component 
is nested within a larger component. It has been proposed that the method of nesting 
is based on utilizing the multiplicities on the lines as a measure of intensity; this 
multiplicity- based measure results in the identification of m-cores. In this paper, an 
m-core is referred to as a nested component that forms a chain of points connected by lines 
of a specified multiplicity (Scott, [2000] pp. 0-0.). Further, an average or an increase 
in the multiplicity of the lines is considered as the cutoff criterion.
4.  The Structure of Intercorporate Network in the U.S. and Japan
() Interlocking Network through Social Network Analysis
　　By conducting a comparative study on the interlocking directorates of General Motors 
as a typical modern corporate enterprises in the 200 U.S. network and on Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industry as a typical modern corporate enterprises in the 994 and 200 Japanese 
network, I attempt to clarity the structure of interlock networks.
　　First and foremost, I measured the centrality score of the individual corporations 
that constitute a network. In the interlocking network of GM, companies that hold a high 
adjacency score expand spread theirs business through globalization (Table ). Citicorp, 
with an adjacency score of 2 and J. P. Morgan, with that of  are the largest banking 
holding companies; in this network, the largest financial institutions and industrials, hold 
a relatively high score of adjacency I consider these financial institutions as the center of 
information; thus, there are a significant number of interlocks within many companies.
　　Next, in 994, I measured centrality score of individual corporations in the interlock 
network of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (Table 2). In Japan, although auditors do not 
participate in decision making of the board of directors, in this paper, both the director 
and the auditor are regarded as the members of the top-management, on account of the 
nature of the auditor's duty to inspect the decision making of the boards and business 
transactions. In the interlock network,  corporations had 0 or more interlocks; further 
there were  financial institutions among the  corporations.  The core corporations 
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(Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsubishi Bank, etc.) of the 
Mitsubishi Presidents Club had several interlocks; in particular, Mitsubishi, a general 
trading company, had the maximun interlocks in this network. In 200, 0 corporations 
had 0 or more interlocks, with 2 financial institutions among them. Similarly to the 
network in 994, the core corporations of the Mitsubishi Presidents Club had relatively 
many interlocks. By measuring the centrality, it was confirmed that there was a decrease 
in the number of individual corporations that had a high centrality score, and that the 
high adjacency score of the corporations in the 200 network was lesser than that in the 
994 network. Further, in the 994 network, corporations belonging  to the Hitachi group, 
Matsushita Electric group, and Tokyu Railway group costituted the network  that was 2 
distance from Mitsubishi Heavy Industry; these had a relatively high centrality score.　
Table1  Centrality in Intercorporate Personal Network around GM
Source: The data are obtained from Mergent (200) Mergent Industrial Manual 2004, 
Mergent and  Mergent (200)Mergent Bank & Finance Manual  2004, Mergent.
Note : Corporations holding relatively high score of centrality are noted in this table.
         2: The mark  * shows financial instisutions.
Adjacency Corporation
2 Citicorp
 J. P. Morgan Chase & Co.
 E.I. Du Pont Co.
 Sara Lee Corp.
4 Mobil Corp
 General Electric Co.
 RJR Nabisco
 Pepsico Inc.
2 Smith Wesson Holding Co.
2 Pfizer Inc.
 General Motors Corp
 International Steel Co.
 Coca Cola Co.
 Champion Technology Holdings Ltd.
0 International Paper Co.
0 United Technologies Corp.
0 Monsant co.
0 Gannet Co.
0 Georgia Pacific Corp.
9 International Aluminum Corp.
9 Whirlpool Corp
9 AT & T
9 Rockwell Automation Inc.
9 Sears Roebuck Co.
9 H.J.Heinz Co.
9 Kraft Foods Inc
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Table 2  Centrality in Intercorporate Personal Network around Mitsubishi Heavy Industry 
Source: The data are obtained from Toyo Keizai Shinposha (99) Yakuin Shikiho(Corporate 
Directors Directory)1 994, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha and Toyo Keizai Shinposha (200) 
Yakuin Shikiho(Corporate Directors Directory) 2004, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
Note : Corporations holding relatively high score of centrality are noted in this table.
         2: The mark  * shows financial instisutions.
994 200
Adjacency Corporation Adjacency Corporation
4 Impreial Hotel 20 Mitsubishi Corporation
 Tokyu Corporation 4 Kirin Breweries
4 Dai-ichi Mutual Life Ins.*  Mitsubishi Heavy Industry
0 Hitachi Ltd.  Japan Ari Line System
29 Mitsubishi Corporation  Aeon
26 Tokyu Recreation 2 Millea Holdings*
2 Tobu Railway  Nikon
2 Tokyu Car Manufacturring  Lawson Inc.
2 Izu Railway 0 Meiji Life Ins.*
2 Nippon Life Ins. 0 Coca-Cola Central
22 Mistubishi Electric 9 Mitsubishi Logistics
2 Hokyu Hotel Chain 9 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial*
20 Asahi Breweries 9 Pioneer
 Matsushita Electric Industry 9 Asahi Breweries
 Shochiku 9 Chubu Electric Power
 Toei 9 Itochu Corporation
6 Japan Airprot Terminal 9 Japan Airport Terminal Co.
 Tokyu Construction 9 Mitsubishi Securities*
 Tokyu Store  Nichirei
 Tokyu Department Store  Hokkoku Bank*
 Tokyu Travel Agency  Kentucky Fried Chicken Japan
 Fukoku Life Ins.*  Mitsubishi Electric
4 Meiji Life Ins.*  Mitsubishi Material
4 ＮＫＫ  Mitsubishi Estate
4 Shiroki Manufacturering  Daido Steel
4 Chubu Electric Power  Okamura Corporation
 Mitsubishi Heavy Industry  Diamond City
 Mitsubishi Oil 6 Honda
 Keihin Ele. Ex. Railway 6 Matsuya Co.
2 Arabian Oil 6 P. S. Mitsubishi Construction
2 Odakyu Realestate  Nissin Foods
 Mitsubishi Bank *  Mitsubishi Steel Mfg. Co.
 Mtsubishi Motors  Mitsubishi Motors
0 Mitsubishi Estate  Nippon Oil
0 Japan Air Line  Shin-Etsu Chemical
9 Mitsubishi Construction  Shin-Etsu Polymer
9 Mitsubishi Material 4 Kinki Coca-Cola Bottling
9 Matsuya 4 Diamond Lease*
 Nikon 4 Sakai Chemical Industry
 Ryoden Trading 4 Ryoshoku Ltd.
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　　A centrality analysis was applied to the network; the results of the analysis confirmed 
the impression formed through the number of interlocks. Therefore, it was setablished that 
financial companies and the largest industrial companies in the U.S. network and general 
trading companies, major industry companies, and financial companies in the Japanese 
network are the key nodes in the network
4)
. 
　　As the next step, I applied the cohesiveness of the network as a whole in both the 
U.S. and Japan. In the U.S., the network density score was 0.00 in 200.  In Japan, 
it  increased from 0.006 in 99 to 0.004 in 200.  In Japan, I consider that this shift 
of cohesiveness is affected by the collapse of the bubble economy and the continuing 
recession. Furthermore, in the range of 2 distance in these networks, intercorporate 
relations are considered as having the tendency of being reorganized as a result of changes 
in the number of corporations that constitute the networks.
　　In addition, I identified the internal structure of the network by nesting the 
components, based on the multiplicity of the line which constituted the a network, in 
order to measure the hierarchical structure of the network. In the U.S. network, the cut 
off criterion was assigned at 2 degrees or more. Three components were indentified as 
the nested components (Table ).  Further, the  companies that consisted the nested 
components were divided into the components based on the identification criterion 4 (2 
companies), criterion  ( companies), and criterion 2 ( companies). These companies were 
financial institutions and non-financial enterprise exending globally.  In particular, it was 
found that strength of interlocking is stronger financial institutions, because they consiste 
in the upper components.
Table 3  Nested Components in the GM Interlock Network 
Source: The data are obtained from Mergent (200) Mergent Industrial Manual 
2004, Mergent and  Mergent (200) Mergent Bank & Finance Manual 2004, 
Mergent.
 4) In Japan, directorates are being frequently dispatched among major banks and industrial companies. 
Based on an analysis on these, I have already comfirmed that dispatching directorates trace the 
structure of intercorporate ownership. See Iwanami, [99].
Componet 
Criterion
Member Corporations
4 Citicorp, E.. I. Du Pont
 Mobil Corp,  Sears Roebuck,  J. P. Morgan Chase, 
2
General Electric,  Pepsico Inc.,  GM, Pfizer Inc.,  
Champion International,   H. J. Heinz,  AT & T,  
GMAC
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Note : Corporations holding relatively high score of centrality are noted in this 
table.
          2: The mark  * shows financial instisutions.
　　In Japan, I examined the hierarchical structure of the network and indentified the 
internal structure of the network by nesting components (Table 4). In 994 and 200, 
the cut off criterion was assigned at 2 degrees or more.  In 994, the nested components 
consisted of 6 companies of which 6 components were identified.  The Tokyu group 
companies that belong to the upper components had several multiplicities of interlocks 
within the Tokyu Railway group. Interlocks among the member companies of the Tokyu 
Railway group tended to overlap; this is characteristic of the Tokyu Railway group 
Table 4  Nested Components in the MHI Interlock Network
Source: The data are obtained from Toyo Keizai Shinposha (99) Yakuin Shikiho(Corporate Directors 
Directory) 994,Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha and Toyo Keizai Shinposha (200) Yakuin 
Shikiho(Corporate Directors Directory) 2004, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.  Comparing nested 
component in U.S. network and in Japan, 
994 200
Member Corporations
Component 
Criterion
Member Corporations
Izu Railway, Tokyu Corporation 
Tokyu Industry, Tokyu Construction 6
Tokyu Hotel Chain, Tokyu Car, Shiroki 
Tokyu Land, Tokyu Recreation, Tokyu Tourist, 
Tokyu Store, Tokyu Department Store, 
Tobu Railway, Tobu Store, Fukoku Life Ins., 
Shochiku, Toei, Toei Chemical, Kabuki-Za 
4
Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Mitsubishi Motors, 
Matsushita Electric Industrial, National 
Housing, Torii Pharmaceutical, Nikka Whisky 
Disttiling, Kaigen, Asahi Brewerise, Sakai 
Chemical Industry, Secom, Dowa Mining, 
Nohmi Bosai, Fujita Kanko 
 Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industry, Mitsubishi Motors 
Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsubishi 
Steel Mfg, Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Estate, 
Mitsubishi Construction, Mitsubishi Shindoh, 
Mitsubishi Materials, Meiji Life Ins., Tokio 
Marine & Fire Ins., Nikon, Diamond City, Toyo 
Engineering Works, Fujikosan, Japan Radio, 
Asahi Breweries, Kinki Coca-Cola Bottling, 
NKK, Tokyo Shiyaringu, Godo Steel, Nippon 
Steel, Nippon Steel Chemical, Dai Denko, 
Hitachi, Hitachi Cable, Hitachi Soft, Nissei 
Sangyo, Hitachi Plant, Hitachi Credit,  NEC, 
Matsushita Electric Works, Sotetsu Transport, 
Jasco, Imperial Hotel, Daiichi Hotel, Tokai 
Kisen, Tokyo Dome
2 Kir in  Breweries ,  Mitsubishi 
Electric, Mitsubishi Financial, 
Mitsubishi Material, Kinki Coca-
Cola Bottling, Nikon, Mitsubishi 
Estate, Nichirei, Chrysler, Meiji 
Life Ins., Mitsubishi Securities, 
Nippon Kakoki, Millea Holdings, 
Kirin Beverage, Coca-Cola Central 
Japan, Kentucky Fried Chicken 
Japan
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interlock.  companies belonging to criterion  components contained constituting 
companies of each component that decreased in proportion to the upper components. With 
the exception of the Tokyu Railway group, constituting companies of each component 
are mainly financial institutions and non-financial enterprises including Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industry, Mitsubishi Bank, Matsushita Electric industrial, and so on. In 200, 
the nested components that consisted of 9 companies and were differented into 2 levels; 
these components consisted of the core companies belonging to the Mitsubishi Presidents 
Club. The decline from 994 to 200 can be explained in terms of “the stagnant 0 years” 
in Japan. Nevertheless, in both 994 and 200, financial institutions and non-financial 
companies belonged to the upper components. Therefore, since the member companies of 
the Mitsubishi group constitute the upper components, these companies strengthen the 
interlocking directorates among these companies.
(2) The Clique of Multiple Directors
　　This section will examine each of the components in order to assess at an assessment 
of the actual role played by financials in intercorporate networks. Based on the core 
of multiple directors, the clique of multiple directors is described as an intercorporate 
network. In this paper, the companies that are examined are members of nested 
components with a cut off criterion of 2 or more. In the U.S. network, the clique consisted 
of 4 companies, namely, Citicorp, AT&T, GM, and GMAC (Figure 2) that comprised 2 
financials and the 2 largest industrials. The network patterns of interlocking resulted in a 
flexible structure, comprising the grouping of the largest banks and the largest industrial 
enterprises. The resulting grouping may be termed as the spheres of influence. In the 
cliques, mega financials and the largest non-financials fuse to form finance capital; thus, 
banks do not form the basis for the exercising of control over non-financials in the network. 
These spheres of influence form the major areas of  interest within an extensive network.
Figure 2 The Clique of Multiple Directors
Source: The data are obtained from Mergent (200) Mergent 
Industrial Manual 2004,Mergent and Mergent (200) 
Mergent Bank & Finance Manual 2004, Mergent.
Citicorp AT &T
ＧＭ
GMAC
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　　In the Japanese network, the clique consisted of 2 companies, namely, 2 Mitsubishi 
financials and the 0 largest industrials, comprising mega financials and the largest 
industrials (Figure ). The patterns have resulted in a rigid structure of tight, because 
the  largest financial institutions and the largest industrial enterprises belong to the same 
group of enterprises. In the cliques, since large financials and large industrials coexist, 
the grouping appears to form a kind of interest group; in the other words, a banks and 
industrials centered interest group.
Figure 3  The Clique of Multiple Directors and Multiple Auditors
Source: The data are obtained from Toyo Keizai Shinposha (200) Yakuin Shikiho (Corporate Directors Directory) 
2004, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha.
.  Conclusion
　　Since an enterprise is a constituent of civil society, I consider that intercorporate 
relations from an aspect of social relations. Further, I consider the structure of 
intercorporate relations as social relations from an interorganizational perspective. Using 
the technique of social network analysis, I confirm the feature of intercorporate relations 
concerning typical large business enterprises in the U.S. and Japan.
　　Banks, other financial institutions, and large industrial companies occupy central 
positions in the U.S. intercorporate networks. They exercise a considerable influence 
Millea 
Holdings
Coca-Cola Central
Mitsubishi Electric
Mitsubishi 
Financial
Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industruy
Mitsubishi
Mitsubishi 
Securities
Mitsubishi Motors
Kirin Breweries Kinki Coca-Cola
Kinrin Beverage
Mitsubishi 
Materials
The Structure of Interlocking Directorates and Corporate Power … (Iwanami)
on the flow of capital and that of information regarding the availability of capital and 
investment opportunities.  Moreover, general trading companies, large industrial 
companies, and banks hold central positions in the Japanese intercorporate networks. 
They exercise a considerable influence on the flow of capital and that of information 
concerning strategic decision making. Enterprises conducting businesses worldwide hold a 
central position in the networks both the U.S. and Japan. Therefore, a sphere of influence 
exists in the network and the interlocks, which lead to a structual constraint, affect the 
decision making of individual enterprises.
　　However, since my focus is on the relevancy between intercorporate relationships and 
individual companies, examining the relevancy between multi-stakeholders and individual 
companies falls outside the scope of my study. In order to comprehend the relations 
between an extensive stakeholder in society and enterprises from an interorganizational 
perspective, it is necessary to clarify the power structure of large corporate enterprises 
relation to enterprises and society.
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